Quantum cryptography with a predetermined key, using continuous-variable Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations by Reid, M. D.
PHYSICAL REVIEW A, VOLUME 62, 062308Quantum cryptography with a predetermined key, using continuous-variable
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations
M. D. Reid
Physics Department, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia
~Received 13 January 2000; published 10 November 2000!
Correlations of the type discussed by EPR in their original 1935 paradox for continuous variables exist for
the quadrature phase amplitudes of two spatially separated fields. These correlations were first experimentally
reported in 1992. We propose to use such EPR beams in quantum cryptography, to transmit with high
efficiency messages in such a way that the receiver and sender may later determine whether eavesdropping has
occurred. The merit of the new proposal is in the possibility of transmitting a reasonably secure yet predeter-
mined key. This would allow relay of a cryptographic key over long distances in the presence of lossy
channels.
PACS number~s!: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.BzThe possibility of using quantum mechanics to transmit
signals in a way that any eavesdropping can be detected by
the receiver and sender is intriguing. This new field of quan-
tum cryptography @1,2# has attracted much attention.
In the pioneering proposal of Bennett and Brassard @1# the
sender ~Alice! transmits to the receiver ~Bob! photon pulses
in one of two orthogonal polarizations ~labeled 0 and 1!,
where the orientation ~basis! of polarization randomly shifts
between 0° and 45°. The 0,1 choice of polarization repre-
sents the bit value. Bob randomly selects a basis (0° or 45°)
for a polarization measurement, and records the resulting bit
value. Alice and Bob later compare notes, through a public
channel, on the sequence of orientations (0° or 45°) chosen.
The bit sequence where Bob selected the same orientation as
Alice forms a key, to be used later to encrypt messages.
While classically an eavesdropper could measure with per-
fect accuracy components of polarization along both direc-
tions, quantum mechanics forbids this by way of the uncer-
tainty principle. As a consequence the eavesdropper cannot
always regenerate the original state transmitted by Alice. The
resulting discrepancy between the results recorded by Alice
and Bob gives warning to the interference by the eavesdrop-
per. No discrepancy implies a secure key.
Other proposals @2#, such as that suggested by Ekert, pro-
pose to use a sequence of two spatially separated photons
with correlated polarization, and whose joint polarization
measurements are predicted by quantum mechanics to show
a violation of a Bell inequality @3#. Such fields have no local
hidden variable interpretation. Any measurement, and subse-
quent state regeneration to mask interference, by an eaves-
dropper along one of these two channels will alter the statis-
tics so that a Bell inequality is always satisfied. Again a
fundamental aspect of quantum mechanics is utilized to alert
receiver and sender to eavesdropping.
The majority of proposals so far focus on the use of single
photons to transmit information. A significant current limita-
tion to the practicality of such schemes is the poor efficiency
of photon counting detectors. This contributes to a significant
loss factor which makes direct efficient communication of
sequences predetermined by Alice difficult. Photon-based
proposals rely in practice on deciphering a sequence ~key! a
posteriori from infrequent detected photons.1050-2947/2000/62~6!/062308~6!/$15.00 62 0623Recently Ralph @4# and Hillery @5# have suggested cryp-
tographic schemes based on measurement of ~continuous
variable! field quadrature phase amplitudes. In their propos-
als Alice transmits a bit value by way of squeezed signals,
which means that the fluctuation in one quadrature phase
amplitude is reduced to a level below that corresponding to
the standard quantum limit as determined by the uncertainty
principle. Security is provided as a result of the uncertainty
principle since an eavesdropper ~Eve! cannot measure both
noncommuting quadrature amplitudes arbitrary accuracy. As
a result Bob’s signal after Eve’s interference will contain
extra noise, detectable when Alice and Bob compare the bit
values received by Bob with the bit values sent by Alice. In
this way, following the example of Bennett and Brassard, a
secure key can be established.
In this paper it is suggested to use continuous variable
measurements in such a way so as to allow transmission of a
predetermined sequence ~or key! directly ~a priori! from
sender to receiver. Later, communication through a public
channel can check whether eavesdropping has occurred. Se-
curity is provided not by comparison of Bob’s received with
Alice’s sent bit values, but by establishing whether Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen correlations @6# between two beams, one re-
tained by Alice and the other transmitted with signal to Bob,
are maintained after transmission. In this last respect the pro-
posal is not unlike the photon-based proposal of Ekert where
security is based on the confirmation by Alice and Bob of a
violation of a Bell inequality.
The scheme involves only quadrature phase amplitude
measurements, which can be performed with high efficiency.
The predetermined nature of the sequence takes most advan-
tage of this high efficiency, since every bit value sent can
contribute to the final message. This contrasts with previous
schemes for which part of the sequence, randomly selected
after transmission, is used only to establish security by way
of the public channel.
The predetermined nature of the sequence could also aid
incorporation of special repeaters, where the signal and cor-
related beams are regenerated to help compensate for trans-
mission loss. This method could potentially secure a single
key between a single sender-receiver pair a long distance
apart.©2000 The American Physical Society08-1
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and Rosen ~EPR! in their original 1935 paradox @6#, for con-
tinuous variables, exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes
of two spatially separated fields @7#. The technology of
quadrature phase amplitude measurement is sufficiently ad-
vanced that in 1992 these correlations were detected, without
detection efficiency problems, by Ou et al. @8#. More re-
cently, continuous variable EPR-correlated beams have been
generated by Zhang et al. @9# and Silberkorn et al. @10#. Such
EPR correlated beams have recently been utilized to enable
quantum state teleportation with continuous variables @11#.
Further work @12# has shown that quadrature phase ampli-
tude measurements on certain twin beams can predict viola-
tions of Bell inequalities.
Consider the nondegenerate parametric down conversion
process, modeled by two field modes with boson operators aˆ
and bˆ , with the interaction Hamiltonian HI5i\k(aˆ †bˆ †
2aˆ bˆ ). We define the quadrature phase amplitudes Xˆ a5(aˆ
1aˆ †), Pˆ a5(aˆ 2aˆ †)/i , Xˆ b5(bˆ 1bˆ †), and Pˆ b5(bˆ 2bˆ †)/i .
The Heisenberg uncertainty relation for the orthogonal am-
plitudes of mode aˆ is D2XaD2Pa>1. The output quadrature
amplitudes are
Xˆ a~ t !5Xˆ a~0 !cosh~kt !1Xˆ b~0 !sinh~kt !,
Xˆ b~ t !5Xˆ b~0 !cosh~kt !1Xˆ a~0 !sinh~kt !,
~1!
Pˆ a~ t !5Pˆ a~0 !cosh~kt !2Pˆ b~0 !sinh~kt !,
Pˆ b~ t !5Pˆ b~0 !cosh~kt !2Pˆ a~0 !sinh~kt !,
where k is proportional to the strength of parametric inter-
action and the t50 operators represent inputs. As kt in-
creases, Xˆ a(t) becomes increasingly correlated with Xˆ b(t),
and Pˆ a(t) becomes increasingly correlated with 2Pˆ b(t), the
correlation becoming perfect in the limit kT→‘ . With out-
put fields aˆ and bˆ spatially separated, this is the situation @7#
of the 1935 EPR correlations.
For imperfect correlation, the degree of correlation may
still be sufficient to ensure EPR correlations @7#. The results
for measurements Xˆ a(t) and Xˆ b(t) @or Pˆ a(t) and Pˆ b(t)# can
be compared, yielding an estimate of the error in inferring
the result of measurement Xˆ a(t) on mode aˆ , based on a
measurement Xˆ b(t) on mode bˆ . We calculate dx5Xˆ a(t)
2gXˆ b(t) and dp5Pˆ a(t)1gPˆ b(t), where the factor g may
be modified to give the minimum error. One can calculate
the variances associated with the inference of Xˆ a from gXˆ b ,
and Pˆ a from gPˆ b : Dx , inf
2 5^dx
2&2^dx&
2 and Dp , inf
2 5^dp
2&
2^dp&
2
. The minimum variance Dx , inf,min
2 ~and Dp , inf,min
2 ) oc-
curs for a particular value of g . Finding the turning point
with g yields @with g5^Xˆ a(T),Xˆ b(T)&/D2Xˆ b(T)# Dx , inf,min2
5DXˆ a
2(T)DXˆ b2(T)2@^Xˆ a(T),Xˆ b(T)&#2/DXˆ b2(T), where ^x ,y&
5^xy&2^x&^y& and one deduces a Dp , inf,min
2 in similar fash-
ion.06230EPR correlations are obtained when the product
Dx , inf
2 Dp , inf
2 drops below the quantum limit given by
D2XaD2Pa>1 @7#:
Dx , inf
2 Dp , inf
2 ,1. ~2!
For arbitrary coherent input states, we predict from Eq. ~1!
@7# (g5tanh 2kt)
Dx , inf,min
2 5Dp , inf,min
2 51/cosh 2kt . ~3!
An identical argument and results hold if the measured op-
erators are Xa2^Xa&, Xb2^Xb& , Pa2^Pa&, and Pb2^Pb& ,
the fluctuations about the mean, as opposed to Xa , Xb , Pa ,
and Pb .
With vacuum inputs to aˆ and bˆ , Bob and Alice can secure
a random key, using the potentially perfect correlation be-
tween quadrature amplitudes. We propose a different
scheme, to allow for predetermined sequences, and imperfect
correlation. For the purposes of cryptography ~Fig. 1!, Alice
chooses as input to the nondegenerate parametric amplifier
one of two possible states: the input for aˆ is either a coherent
state ua0expip/4&a ~bit value 1! or a coherent state
ua1expip/4&a ~bit value 0!, where a0 and a1 are real. The
input for bˆ is a vacuum state u0&b . The signal is transmitted
by spatially separating the two output fields and propagating
to Bob the output field of mode aˆ . Bob can read the message
by measuring either Xˆ a(t) or Pˆ a(t). Suppose Bob chooses to
measure Xˆ a(t). The probability distribution for his obtaining
a result x, given Alice’s choice ua0expip/4&, is the Gaussian
exp@2(x2A2a0cosh kt)2/2s2#/sA2p with mean
A2a0cosh kt and standard deviation s5Acosh 2kt. If Alice
chose ua1expip/4& the probability for Bob’s outcome is exp
@2(x2A2a1cosh kt)2/2s2#/sA2p , the Gaussian mean
shifted by A2(a02a1)cosh kt. Provided s!A2(a0
2a1)cosh kt, the bit value is clearly determined from Bob’s
result x ~Fig. 2!: x near A2a0cosh kt implies 1; x near
A2a1cosh kt implies zero. The bit value can also be deter-
mined by a measurement of quadrature phase amplitude
Pˆ a(t), in this case the input ua0expip/4& giving a Gaussian
distribution about A2a0cosh kt ~bit value 1!, while
ua1expip/4& gives a distribution centered about A2a1cosh kt
~bit value 0!.
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the EPR cryptographic
scheme. The EPR device generates fields aˆ and bˆ which are EPR
correlated. The bit value is given by Alice’s choice of input to aˆ .8-2
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phase measurements, randomly selecting to measure either
Xˆ a(t) or Pˆ a(t), and subtracting from his result either
A2a0cosh kt or A2a1cosh kt, so that only the fluctuation
about the mean of the particular distribution is recorded ~Fig.
2!. Bob then communicates to Alice, through a public chan-
nel, the sequence of recorded fluctuations together with mea-
surements @Xˆ a(t) or Pˆ a(t)# chosen ~the bit value itself is not
communicated!. Alice also makes a sequence of consecutive
measurements Xˆ b(t) or Pˆ b(t), ~preferably! to coincide with
Bob’s measurement sequence, and records similarly only the
fluctuation about the mean ~in this case A2a0sinh kt or
A2a1sinh kt for Xb , and 2A2a0sinh kt or 2A2a1sinh kt
for Pb). Bob and Alice compare notes, through the public
channel, to calculate a Dx , inf
2 Dp , inf
2
. The predicted minimum
is, for optimized g , given by Eq. ~3!.
Verification by Bob and Alice of the EPR correlations
Dx , inf
2 Dp , inf
2 ,1 gives an indication of interference by an
eavesdropper ~Eve!. Let us consider various practical options
by Eve. To determine the signal Eve’s first obvious choice
may be to capture the field aˆ and measure either Xˆ a or Pˆ a . If
she is able to predetermine correctly for each bit value the
choice (Xˆ a or Pˆ a! to be made by Bob, Eve can make the
same choice and conceal her eavesdropping. However, Bob’s
choice is delayed until after his detection of aˆ forcing errors
in Eve’s selection. Quantum mechanics makes it impossible
for Eve to measure both amplitudes (Xˆ a and Pˆ a) to an un-
certainty better than that given by the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation. More importantly, Eve cannot regenerate and trans-
mit to Bob a single mode state with both well defined Xˆ and
Pˆ , but is limited by D2Xˆ D2Pˆ >1. For example Eve may
select to measure Xˆ a rather precisely so that the error in the
measurement is of order Dm
2 51/r , where r.1. Eve may then
generate, to transmit to Bob, a ‘‘squeezed’’ state with this
reduced fluctuation in X, so that the new operator describing
the quadrature measurement now made by Bob is Xˆ a
new5xa
1dXˆ a where xa is the result of Eve’s measurement and
D2dXˆ a51/r . Quantum mechanics compels an enhanced
fluctuation in Pˆ , so that the operator describing the quadra-
ture measurement Pˆ a made by Bob on this retransmitted
state is Pˆ a
new5pa1dPˆ a where at best D2dPˆ 5r for a mini-
FIG. 2. Schematic plot of the probability distribution P(x) for
obtaining a result x upon measurement of the quadrature phase am-
plitude of a or b, where one Gaussian peak represents input
ua0expip/4&a ~bit value 1! and the other input ua1expip/4&a ~bit value
0!. Bob is able to infer the bit value from x and record, for later
communication to Alice, the deviation X˜ of his result from the
~known! mean of the distribution as indicated.06230mum uncertainty squeezed state. The variances Dx , inf,min
2 and
Dp , inf,min
2 testing for supposed EPR correlations are now
D
xnew,inf,min
2
5Dx,inf,min
2 1D2dXˆ a and Dpnew,inf,min
2
5Dp,inf,min
2
1D2dPˆ , where here we have Dx , inf,min
2 5Dp,inf,min
2 51/cosh kt.
This gives Dx , inf,min
2 Dp,inf,min
2 >1, and EPR correlations are
lost, making a sensitive test for interference on aˆ . We note
that it is possible for Eve to gain access to bit values, but
whether this has occurred is later checked by communication
between sender and receiver.
To improve her chances, as discussed by Ralph @4#, Eve
may alternatively opt to make a partial interference of beam
a by tapping off only part of the beam using a partially
transmitting beam splitter, with a and avac as inputs, where
avac is a vacuum input ~Fig. 3!. The outputs are: aˆ Bob
5Ahaˆ 1A12haˆ vac , the field transmitted and detected by
Bob; and aˆ Eve5A12haˆ 2Ahaˆ vac , the field detected by Eve
to allow her measurement of Xa . Here h gives the fraction
of photons transmitted, on to Bob, by the beamsplitter. We
define the quadrature amplitudes Xˆ a
Bob5aˆ Bob1aˆ Bob
†
, Pˆ a
Bob
5(aˆ Bob2aˆ Bob† )/i , Xˆ aEve5aˆ Eve1aˆ Eve† and Pˆ aEve5(aˆ Eve
2aˆ Eve
† )/i . For a vacuum input we have D2Xˆ vac5D2Pˆ vac51:
Xˆ a
Bob~ t !5AhXa~ t !1A12hXvac ,
Xˆ a
Eve~ t !5AhXvac2A12hXa~ t !,
~4!
Pˆ a
Bob~ t !5AhPa~ t !1A12hPvac ,
Pˆ a
Eve~ t !5AhPvac2A12hPa~ t !.
The variances Dx , inf,min
2 and Dp , inf,min
2 later measured by Alice
and Bob, testing for EPR correlations, are now
D
xnew,inf,min
2
5hDx , inf,min
2 1~12h!D2Xˆ vac ,
~5!
Dpnew,inf,min
2
5hDp , inf,min
2 1~12h!D2Pˆ vac .
With h→1 the back-action noise (A12hXvac for measure-
ment X) feeding into Bob’s signal as a result of Eve’s tap-
ping is decreased. In this limit, the change (12h)D2Xˆ vac
and (12h)D2Pˆ vac to the variances Dx , inf2 and Dp , inf2 respec-
tively, as a result of Eve’s eavesdropping becomes increas-
ingly undetectable. Eve however pays the price, since she
observes a reduced signal @2A12hXa(t) for the measure-
FIG. 3. Schematic representation of Eve’s attempt to make mea-
surement of Xa(t) using a partial beam splitter.8-3
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ability to obtain information from the channel. With noise
AhXvac from the vacuum input increasing as h→1, a point
is reached where she can no longer resolve the two peaks,
separated by A2A12h cosh kt(a02a1), giving the bit value.
In an effort to reduce the feedback noise (12h)D2Xˆ vac in
Bob’s signal, and to allow better resolution of the bit value
for larger h , Eve may choose to perform a quantum non-
demolition measurement of quadrature amplitude Xˆ a ~Fig.
3!. Such measurements allow accurate determination of Xˆ a
~to D2Xˆ <1) and have been achieved experimentally @13#.
The quantum nondemolition measurement may be performed
using the beam splitter as above ~Fig. 3! but where avac is a
squeezed vacuum input so that D2Xˆ vac,1 ~suppose DXˆ vac
51/r). Increased squeezing of the fluctuation in
Xvac (D2Xˆ vac→0) implies that XaBob(t)5AhXa(t) and XaEve
52A12hXa(t) and perfect inference of Xa(t) is obtainable
by Eve, without any feedback vacuum noise in the value
XBob(t) later measured by Bob. However large fluctuations
in Pvac ~we must have DPˆ vac5r to satisfy the uncertainty
principle for the squeezed vacuum input state! necessarily
create a large noise in Pa
Bob :
Pa
Bob~ t !5AhPa~ t !1A12hPvac . ~6!
This excess noise, detectable when Bob selects to measure P
rather than X, causes an increase in Dpnew,inf,min
2
5hDp,inf,min
2
1(12h)D2Pˆ vac , alerting Bob to Eve’s interference.
The presence of loss due to transmission will also reduce
the EPR correlation. Loss ~and detection inefficiencies! may
be modeled by a beam splitter which mixes our signal mode
aˆ with a vacuum field aˆ vac to give a new output at Bob’s
detector: aˆ new5Ahaˆ 1A12haˆ vac . Here h is the overall ef-
ficiency factor (h→1 for no loss!. The new noise levels
measured by Bob are
D
xnew,inf,min
2
5h2Dx , inf,min
2 1~12h2!,
~7!
Dpnew,inf,min
2
5h2Dp , inf,min
2 1~12h2!.
With h.0, a partial loss, EPR correlations are still main-
tained, though decreased. For complete loss we obtain
D
xnew,inf,min
2
5Dpnew,inf,min
2
51.
In practice, the degree of EPR correlation for a given
transmission line and distance would be accurately estab-
lished. This degree of correlation is independent of Alice’s
bit value. Any increase of our EPR noise indicator above this
previously evaluated level alerts Bob to the additional loss
caused by a partial tapping of the channel by Eve.
Security is also provided by comparing individual results
of measurements made by Alice and Bob. For a given trans-
mission line and loss along this line, and for a given bit value
~based on the choice a) the mean and shape ~the shape is
predicted to be independent of the bit value! of the measured
distribution can also be accurately recorded. A specified re-
sult for the measurement ~or fluctuation about the mean! Xb06230made by Alice will imply a conditional probability distribu-
tion for the measurement ~or fluctuation about mean! Xa
made by Bob. In the absence of loss the variance of this
conditional distribution is Dx , inf,min
2
. Loss increases the vari-
ance by the amount given above in Eq. ~7!. Significant de-
viation of a result for Bob from this distribution is indication
of Eve’s presence. Importantly loss acts to increase noise
levels in X and P equally. Marked increase, for some of the
bit values sent, in the deviation of Bob’s measurement from
Alice’s predicted result for Bob would alert Alice and Bob to
the possibility of Eve having performed a quantum non-
demolition measurement as discussed above.
Eve’s best chance then may be to perform measurement
with a partial beam splitter with standard vacuum input, in
the hope that the extra noise put back into Bob’s channel will
not be noticeable over loss. To safeguard against this Alice
and Bob must evaluate by measurements the minimum extra
noise, or additional loss, for which they would conclude the
existence of a potential eavesdropper. With this value of h
Eve could have performed a measurement ~4! and would be
compelled to infer a bit value based on extra noise levels as
indicated by Eq. ~4!. Bob and Alice must select the differ-
ence between inputs a0 and a1 so that Eve is unable to
Schemes using Bell inequalities @2# can also be proposed
in principle for quadrature phase detection, since the failure
of local realism has recently @12# been predicted possible for
such measurements, for certain types of quantum states. One
such state is the pair-coherent state @12#
uC&5NE
0
2p
ur0ei§&aur0e2i§&bd§ . ~8!
Here N is a normalization coefficient, we choose r051.1 and
ua&q (q5a ,b) is a coherent state for the mode qˆ . Also we
might consider the two-mode ‘‘Schrodinger cat’’ state under-
going interaction for a time t with a parametric amplifier @10#
uC&5NUˆ ~ ua0&aub0&b1u2a0&au2b0&b), ~9!
where U5exp@2iHˆ It/\#, and we choose a05b050.9 and
kt50.6 Our protocol is not a direct parallel of Ekert’s for
spin-1/2 particles, because for states ~8! and ~9! there is not a
perfect correlation between quadrature amplitude measure-
ments on aˆ ,bˆ .
After generation of the state ~8! @or Eq. ~9!#, the two fields
aˆ and bˆ are spatially separated. Alice may then choose to
phase shift the field aˆ by 180° or not, this choice of relative
phase between aˆ and bˆ being her signal. The field aˆ is then
propagated to Bob at a distant location A. The signal is trans-
mitted from Alice to Bob in the form of blocks, consisting of
many (N say where N is large! identical states with the same
value of phase shift. Bob measures at a location A a quadra-
ture phase amplitude Xˆ u
A5Xˆ acos u1Pˆ asin u for each state
comprising a certain block, where u randomly varies be-
tween u50,p/2,3p/2, for state ~8! @or between u
50,0.42p ,20.28p ,1.42p ,0.72p for state ~9!#. Alice also
makes a series of measurements Xˆ f
B5Xˆ bcos f1Pˆ bsin f at a8-4
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23p/4, for state ~8! @or between f50,20.28p ,0.42p for
state ~9!#. Alice then communicates to Bob through a public
channel the results for her quadrature phase amplitude mea-
surements.
Bob may build up, for each block, the probability distri-
bution P(qa ,qb) for getting results qa and qb upon measure-
ment of Xˆ a at aˆ and Xˆ b at bˆ , respectively. This information is
given by the u50 and f50 measurements. The shape of the
distribution changes with the choice of phase shift, and gives
the bit value. This information is not determinable from the
measurements of amplitudes made on bˆ alone, and hence
cannot be determined by the information passed along the
public channel.
To check whether eavesdropping has occurred, Bob tests
for a Bell inequality. The result of the measurement is clas-
sified as 11 if the quadrature phase result x is greater than or
equal to zero, and 21 otherwise. We define the probability
distributions: P1
A (u) for obtaining 11 at aˆ upon measure-
ment of Xˆ u
A ; P1
B (f) for obtaining 11 at bˆ upon measure-
ment of Xˆ f
B ; and P11
AB (u ,f) the joint probability of obtain-
ing a 11 result at both aˆ and bˆ . The existence of a local
hidden variable theory implies the ‘‘strong’’ Bell-Clauser-
Horne inequality @3#:
S5
P11
AB ~u ,f!2P11
AB ~u ,f8!1P11
AB ~u8,f!1P11
AB ~u8,f8!
P1
A ~u8!1P1
B ~f!
<1. ~10!
For state ~8!, a violation of this inequality occurs with S
’1.0157, and with angles given by u50,f52p/4,u8
5p/2,f8523p/4 @12#. For state ~9!, violation given by S
51.008 is obtained for angles u50.42p ,f520.28p ,u8
50.28p ,f850.42p @12#. The above violations also hold for
the states generated by phase shifting aˆ by 180°, with the
choice of angles for f as before, but replacing u with u
1p and u8 with u81p .
Violation of the Bell inequality at the level predicted by
quantum mechanics ensures that no interference by Eve has
occurred along aˆ ~see Ekert @2#!. Suppose Eve performs a
measurement on the field aˆ , measuring Xˆ u0
A say to obtain a
result xu0. She then generates and transmits to Bob a state
uFxu ,u0&. The density operator for the new combined system0
06230is r5rxu0,u0
B rxu0,u0
A where rxu0,u0
B 5^xu0uC&^Cuxu0& is the re-
duced density matrix for field bˆ given the measurement by
Eve, uxu0& is the eigenstate of Xˆ u0
A
, and rxu0,u0
A
5uFxu0,u0&^
Fxu0,u0
u. Bob tests for the Bell inequality using
Px ,y
AB(u ,f), the joint probability for respective results x and y
for measurements Xˆ u
A and Xˆ f
B
. With intervention,
Px ,y
AB~u ,f!5(
xu0
(
u0
P~xu0,u0!^yfu^xu0uC&^Cuxu0&uyf&
3^xuuFxu0,u0&^
Fxu0,u0
uxu& , ~11!
where P(xu0,u0) is the probability that Eve obtains a result
xu0
for her measurement. We have the form Px ,y
AB(u ,f)
5*r(l) pxA(u ,l)pyB(f ,l) dl from which a Bell inequality
follows, regardless of the state regenerated by Eve.
In terms of feasibility, the second scheme based on the
Bell inequality is more likely to be limited by difficulty of
state preparation and susceptibility to loss (h50.96 destroys
violations @12# and is greatly limited by its use of redun-
dancy!. The first scheme, not so limited, may offer advan-
tages over schemes utilizing photon counting. The high de-
tection efficiencies give a very much reduced overall loss
factor, which may make it possible to transmit directly and
efficiently a predetermined message, later checking provid-
ing a means to check security. The generation and detection
of EPR correlations with Dx , inf
2 Dp , inf
2 50.7 has been achieved
@8#. The generation of squeezed ~where D2Xˆ u
A,1 for some
u) optical and soliton pulses @10,14# opens up possibilities
for transmission of EPR correlated fields. The robustness of
squeezing to propagation loss has not been keenly explored,
but similar distances should be achievable for EPR correla-
tions. This loss represents the chief limitation to long dis-
tance transmission, since loss acts to degrade the EPR corre-
lations which must be kept at Dx , inf
2 Dp , inf
2 ,1. Repeated
detection and regeneration of the signal with new EPR fields
could help combat loss. Security then relies on a set of send-
ers and receivers being able to communicate reliably at a
later stage, after the detections.
In recent applications @11# EPR beams have been gener-
ated as the two outputs of a beam splitter with squeezed
vacuum state inputs. It would be possible to use such EPR
beams for our cryptography scheme where the squeezed
vacuum is replaced by an amplitude squeezed state.@1# C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Pro-
cessing, Bangalore, India ~IEEE, New York, 1984!, p. 175; A.
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